This descript consists of 3 pages.
Copy No. 4 of 4.
Series.

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The Monortary

Patrick.

Milion R. Elliott

Subjects.

Outlide

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I am aware of the considerations that probably notivated the handling of the matter in the way it was subsequently handled. The impact of the President's speech was electrifying and very reassuring. There was no question that he had the necessary support from this country and, eddly enough, from some people from whom we might not have expected it, such as the Canadians, including, as fer as one could see, all important segments of Canadian opinion, in spite of Cyrus Eatom's influence which is graviling there.

Unfortunately, he rapidly lost the support, if he ever had is, of those people who always think that talk is better than action, and that the sole object of negotiations is to avoid any risks rather than doing what his speech indicated - taking risks to avoid the supreme risk.

The New York Times of last Sunday was almost devoted to what I suspect was, as usual, a British line since the Times is generally so oriented: I refer to what I would wenture to call the preposed Turkish sellout - one of the most dangerous gambits in Ehruschev's game of chang. This was fortunately very well handled by the Administration.

Mr. Friendly in the Washington Post was postifical but fr mally in the way that one should remember in terms of the Italian provers - "God protect us from our friends - we can take care of our ensains of reliver". He wound up in his interesting last paragraph or two on the note of "by all means conceds enough to take Karuschev off the book and avoid putting him in an embarrassing or dengarous position in Russia". This and other stock Lippmann themes appeared to be very much in the vings smong those who have always full them the kind of forthright confrontation that the President while the distributes and that a series of "concessions" would not do up while the financial one is at a lose to know what they mean by "mathematical they say "at all costs keep talking". "There is a time for all the for the Bible".

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October 31, 1962

I would like to put in a guarded way a few observations which I think in set speck to be spelled out:

- 1. The first is that to depend solely on the United Matiens for dealing with Castre and for verifying the removal of Seviet missile bases; sould be bed enough even if we had insisted, as we did not in the exchanges unde public, on keeping this inspection on indefinitely as long as there was a Russian in Cuba or a Russian ship touching there. Otherwise, the well known capabilities for hiding warheads and nuclear missiles in a territory as west as Cuba remain open and can hardly be expected not to be utilized by an enemy who has practiced deception with the most incredible and open regularity. The latest instance is, of course, a sufficient witness.
- 2. To give an unqualified (or to allow Karuschev to interpret as unqualified) assurance that we will not "attack" or "invade" Cuba without making it clear that we will always record to measures of celf defence against anyone who violates the agreements for the withdrawal of any form of long range capabilities employing maclear veapons, including submarine bases, would appear to be capable of dangerous abuse by its possibilities of erecting a safe haven from which Cuba may exercise whatever forms of aggression are not capable of being dealt with through U. N. action. These forms would include direct action as the sabstupe of large facilities in Venezuela and the less recent "directed plot" to everture that Government, which I would have called a direct aggression.

It would seem to me necessary to make absolutely certain that this is a clear policy of this Government and the postifical advice of Mr. Murray Marder in this Merning's Post that "by opting for tension-reduction, Vashington can help set the route for Messee" will be rejected in favor of not permitting "this tone" to leave the entire substance of what the President had wen by his speech and immediate artise programs, correctly limited to deal with the immediate realities of the situation.

3. A crucial test of vest we intend to do in the future that will see the washe tens of whether we slide back or neve ferward in denisting with continue, of ocurse; the refusal to argue about giving up for black for the event more crucial positive test will be the continue time of the black of the overflights and all other necessary intelligence prosedure what is actually being done behind the present desired with the present desired with the present desired with the present desired and all other of delay and secrecy which castro is present.

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he Balenet sight country secretar to its. Essuschev's bland ascuration that he had now secured a complete guarantee of Castro immentar true day use of armed forces necessary for our solf defense, and so avoid a continued delay and deception that takes the autire force out of the President's position, we shall be confronted with Mr. Castro's professing that no one can tell him what to do when he doesn't want to do it and that Mescov's pladges were not binding on him. In that case, I should think the United States might demand either that the United Nations enforce the agreement on Castro or take action in its own self defense to do so if the United Mations is in default. To hold Moscow responsible for Castro's acts has attractions but dangerous ambiguities.

I am aware that the atmosphere is charged with all serie of petentialities. On the evidence the greatest petential danger is that we shall continue to repeat the errors of not facing this type of taction by continued pressure and villingness to act. Whenever we have shown that villingness to act on sound grounds not vital to the basic survival of the Seviet system, we have never failed to get both the backing of the people of the United States and its allies and the backdown of Muscow confronted with action - not words. The greatest danger that exists to that could lead really to war or to our surrender is the danger that Kuruschev may come to believe that we will not under any circumstances really risk war if he gives us a plausible way to substitute words for action and thus permit him to finesse a retention of his gains or a sizeable improvement of his position on the choseboard.

Addressed to you from me simply as a citizen of the United States. I should not have had to classify these remarks. If my making them to you as a Consultant is embarrassing, I should be glad to resume my freedom as a citizen. This country never needed unity more. I felt with the President's really wenderful speech that we were well on the roa d to achieving not only that unity but a sense of moral security and fertitude which must always be its base. The President's face was an inspiring promise of the kind of leadership which he has shown himself capable of giving this nation. I pray that we will not less this advantage through any efforts to please those people whose past salvice ought to be weighed in terms of the penalte.

bill Electel

William Y. Elliott

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cc: Mr. George McGhee

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HELDENDUM

To:

The Secretary

From:

Williem Y. Elliott

Subject:

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SANITIZED VERSION

Si 11/2/62

Time document consists of 3 pages.
O. . No. 2 of 4.
Series A

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The Secretary - 2

October 31, 1962

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3. A crucial test of what we intend to do in the future that will set the whole tone of whether we click back or move forward in dealing with Castro was, of course, the refusal to argue about giving up the base. But an even more crucial positive test will be the continuation of the blockade and the overflights end all other necessary intelligence procedures to determine what is actually being done behind the present dangerous and, I think, not permissible cloak of delay and secreey which Castro is creating.

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The Secretary • 3

4. Unless this country responds to Mr. Khruschey's bland ensumption that he has now secured a complete guarantee of Costro issumity from any use of enough forces necessary for our self defense, and convoid a continued delay and deseption that takes the entire force out of the President's position, we shall be confronted with Mr. Contro's professing that no one can tell him what to do when he desen't want to do it and that Horcow's pledges were not binding on him. In that eace, I should think the United Chates might do and either that the United Nations enforce the agreement on Costro or take action in its own self defense to do so if the United Nations is in default. To hold Hoscow responsible for Castro's acts has attractions but dengerous ambiguities.

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William Y. ElMott

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ec: Mr. George McChee

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